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Thirty years on from the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the international norm for the age of 
political majority remains set at 18 years of age. With few exceptions, those under 18 are denied access 
to the single most important component of formal political participation – the right to vote in elections 
(whether local or national). Practical efforts have primarily been focused on the incremental inclusion of 
older children into the franchise, via attempts to lower the voting age to sixteen. Theoretical arguments, 
by contrast, have defended a much more expansive position on the inclusion of children, whether 
lowering the age to 14, 12, or even eliminating age limits entirely. In this paper, I explore the gap between 
practice and theory. I argue that proponents of children’s enfranchisement should commit to arguing, at 
the practical level, for drastic changes to our democratic systems, so as, if successful, to enfranchise all 
those children who have a strong claim to political inclusion, rather than merely those closest  to 18 years 
of age. Such a commitment to the theoretically more defensible (although politically less likely) positions 
could work to the advantage of children, by making moves such as the lowering of the voting age into the 
reasonable compromise position, rather than an extreme to be opposed. 
 
1. Introduction 
Three decades after the advent of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, popular advocacy for the 
political inclusion of young people remains focused on lowering the voting age to 16. This advocacy has, 
as yet, had limited success, and while there are still some encouraging developments, both in the form of 
recent successes in expanding the franchise, and in terms of meaningful public discussion of and 
engagement with the idea of lowering the voting age, we seem unlikely to see a sudden and drastic change 
in state practice. By comparison to the practical level, the twenty-first century has seen a range of 
theoretically grounded arguments about the enfranchisement of the child, and these have served both to 
 
 
undermine older theories of what childhood entailed, and to argue that many children are fully competent 
participants in democracy, with the knowledge, skills and maturity required to vote.  
In this paper, I will first examine the extent of practical change in voting age limits over the past thirty 
years, and analyse the reasoning used in the public sphere to make the case for lowering the voting age. 
This almost exclusively consists of attempts to lower the voting age to 16, whether drawing on theory or 
on the experience of those states which have already lowered the voting age, such as Austria. I examine 
public response to these movements through case studies of New Zealand and Australia, both of which 
have seen a recent uptick in public interest in the issue. Secondly, I provide a brief overview of academic 
arguments regarding the political capabilities of children, and the defensibility of the voting age as a 
means of disenfranchisement. I note that these arguments are far more expansive than the practical ones, 
such that even the widespread success of the public campaigns discussed above, would not resolve the 
problems for enfranchisement identified in the academic literature. I argue that we have good reasons to 
support a much lower voting age, than the practical campaigns are pursuing. Finally, I suggest that, 
perhaps counter-intuitively, we might have more success at moving the voting age down, if we were to 
stop representing Votes at 16 as an endpoint. Instead, we ought to make the public case that much 
younger children are competent to vote, and thereby, make the enfranchisement of 16 year olds more 
politically palatable. Whether the values appealed to are the capacity of the children in question, the 
consistency of our democratic procedures in treating relevantly like citizens alike, or our commitment to 
the CRC, we have reasons to argue for significant, rather than incremental change.  
 
2. Votes at 16 
In this section, I will first illustrate the commitment to incremental change, then analyse the changes in 
state practice over the last thirty years. Then, I will discuss the current state of public opinion on the role 
of children, using New Zealand as a case study. 
A commitment to incremental changes to the voting age at the policy level is easily identifiable. There are 
many active campaigns for the lowering of the voting age. These share a common commitment to a voting 
age of 16, whether we are examining pan-European efforts such as the European Youth Forum 
(https://www.youthforum.org/vote-16), which is an umbrella organisation for young European citizens, 
or more local organisations. Local examples include campaigns such as ‘Votes at 16’ in the United Kingdom 
(http://www.votesat16.org/), Vote16USA in the United States of America (https://vote16usa.org/), or 
‘Make it 16’ in New Zealand (https://makeit16nz.wordpress.com/). The National Youth Rights Association 
of the USA doesn’t explicitly argue for votes at 16, but throughout their appeals for lowering the voting 
age, refers to 16 (https://www.youthrights.org/). There are obvious tactical reasons for having a 
 
 
determinate target in mind in such campaigns, and given the continuing problem of public disapproval for 
any move to lower the voting age, a commitment to 16 rather than any lower age is understandable. As 
McAllister noted, “publics across the established democracies are generally opposed to lowering the 
voting age from 18 to 16” (2014). Gerison Lansdown, writing for the Innocenti Digest in 2005, said that 
“Lowering the voting age – for example, to 16 years – would increase respect for and interest in the views 
and concerns of young people, and provide them with political rights consistent with many of the 
responsibilities they are expected to carry” (Lansdown, 2005, 62). However, even the rhetoric of these 
campaigns is not obviously relevant only to 16 & 17 year olds. Consider the reasons presented by 
Vote16USA to justify their campaign:  
Reason #1: we need to encourage effective and relevant civic learning 
Reason #2: sixteen- and 17-year-olds have a stake in the game, and politicians 
must pay attention to them 
Reason #3: sixteen- and 17-year-olds are ready to vote 
Reason #4: we need to make voting a habit 
Reason #5: demographic trends hurt youth in elections: lowering the voting age 
can reverse it (http://vote16usa.org/5-reasons-for-lowing-voting-age-16/) 
Each of these plausibly provides reasons to expand the voting age, not just to 16 & 17 year olds, but to all 
children to whom the reasons apply. We will see, in the following discussion of theoretical arguments for 
lowering the voting age, that they apply to many children much younger than 16. As such, the choice to 
focus on 16 is one made because it is considered to be more likely to succeed, than any lower target. 
Of course, these practical efforts to expand the enfranchisement of children have had some success over 
the past thirty years. In addition to the activist groups mentioned above, political parties in many states 
now advocate for lowering the voting age to 16. But there remain few states where this has actually 
occurred. Amongst the successes, we can include Brazil, which lowered the voting age from 18 to 16 prior 
to the 1989 Presidential election. Brazil maintains some differences in the responsibilities attaching to 16 
& 17 year olds as compared to the majority of eligible voters, in particular, that voting is not compulsory 
for them, while it is for other citizens (until the age of 70). Argentina also made voting optional for 16 & 
17 year olds in 2012. Within the European Union, Austria was the first and remains the most prominent 
example of a state that has lowered their voting age, having done so in 2007 at the national level – the 
endpoint of a progression which began in 2000 at the municipal level amongst some states. Scotland 
lowered the voting age in 2016, again to 16, and Malta lowered the age to 16 in 2018. There has also been 
 
 
movement to lower the voting age at the local level in a range of jurisdictions. If we look forward at 
potential future changes, the result of the 2019 United Kingdom election might have important 
implications, given that the Conservatives are the only major party opposed to lowering the voting age, 
while Australia currently has a bill before their parliament, introduced by Adam Bandt of the Greens, to 
lower the voting age there to 16. 
In NZ, the ‘Make it 16’ campaign launched in September 2019. While not the first such attempt in New 
Zealand, it has been some time since lowering the voting age was seriously discussed. The 1986 Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System recommended lowering the voting age (as part of the same process, 
NZ changed to a proportional representative electoral system), but that recommendation was rejected, 
as was an attempt in 2007 by a Greens MP, Sue Bradford, to introduce a bill on the matter. This youth-led 
initiative has the support of the Green Party of New Zealand, but has not yet had time to make a significant 
impact on political practice. However, responses to this campaign have illustrated the difficulties faced by 
campaigners for a lower voting age, in particular that there remains a stark partisan divide in support for 
such an expansion. The Green Party of New Zealand, as well as the Children’s Commissioner of New 
Zealand, Andrew Becroft, are in favour of lowering the voting age (NZHerald, 2018), but the largest party 
in government, the Labour party, is neutral on the matter, while their coalition partner, NZ First, are 
strongly opposed. Darroch Ball, the NZFirst spokesperson on law and order, says that“[t]he fact that youth 
don’t vote is not a poor reflection on politics but a very real reflection of the laziness and apathy that 
plagues our younger generations” (Ball, 2019). Similarly, the National Party youth spokesperson Nicola 
Willis said, in response to the launch of the Make it 16 campaign, that young people both should and do 
have a voice in governance, even without a vote. She also claimed that a vote is not necessary for them, 
as they can already present to select committees, bring forward petitions, lobby and petition their local 
MPs and Members of Parliament, and protest (Satherley, 2019). So, we see that the more left-wing parties 
support broader enfranchisement, while right-wing parties are opposed. This division is mirrored in the 
United Kingdom and Australia, while in the USA there is little support from either major party. 
Public opinion is, if anything, more aligned with the right-wing parties than with those on the left, with 
majorities in the UK, Scotland, and Australia opposing the lowering of the voting age. (McAllister, 2014). 
However, there is some reason to believe that younger voters are more likely to vote for left-wing parties, 
and as such, the support for lowering the voting age from this side of the political spectrum is more 
understandable. Not only are the opinions of young people are not sought by those doing opinion polling, 
but turnout amongst those enfranchised for the first time at 18 is low compared to the electorate as a 
whole. If one believes that enfranchising voters earlier will help increase or maintain turnout, this provides 




3. The case for Enfranchising Children 
There are many reasons offered in the literature for enfranchising children, such that a full accounting of 
them is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather than attempting to do so, I will focus on arguments around 
capacity for political participation. These arguments claim that many children have the capacity for 
political participation (however that is instantiated), and that capacity is a sufficient justification for the 
enfranchisement of a citizen. Fowler claims for example that “these differences in capacities are in fact 
the only relevant feature that divides children from adults” (2014, 96). If this is so, we have reason to 
enfranchise all capable child citizens, as there is no other relevant feature which would warrant their 
continued disenfranchisement. Arguments of this kind have been made by many authors, including myself 
(2012a, 2012b), Joanne Lau (2012), Claudio López-Guerra (2012), Timothy Fowler (2014), and Lachlan 
Umbers (2018). In this section I will briefly defend the focus on capacity, before surveying the range of 
arguments for the capacity of children. 
 
3.1 Why focus on capacity? 
Some opponents of children’s enfranchisement deny that (lack of) capacity is all that matters for 
enfranchisement, suggesting that children lack experience, are easily manipulated, or will actively harm 
democracies if included. I take it, however, that these concerns are incompatible with our commitments 
to enfranchisement more generally.  That is, if we were to exclude from the franchise those who lack 
experience, are easily manipulated, or whose inclusion will harm democracy, we would have to drastically 
re-envision enfranchisement more generally. If we only care about these matters when enfranchising 
children, we are using them as excuses for disenfranchisement, rather than as reasons. 
While a complete defence of this claim is beyond the scope of the current paper, I think it is worth noting 
how the objection is cashed out. In short, if an interlocutor wishes to use any of these other considerations 
as reasons to exclude children from the franchise, we may justifiably ask them whether they are willing to 
consistently apply the consideration to all citizens. Will they accept the disenfranchisement of all those 
who are easily manipulated, or does the fact of being easily manipulated matter only when it is coupled 
with youth? If the latter, then it is not manipulability, but age, which is doing the work. Consistency 
requires that we utilise manipulability as a criterion for exclusion equally across all citizens, or not at all. 
With the exception of some epistocratic arguments against democracy itself, the position that our 
 
 
democracies should be exclusionary is deeply unpopular. So, it is safe to conclude that we are unwilling 
to use manipulability as an exclusionary criterion.1 
 
3.2 The scope of arguments for lowering the voting age 
There is a range of arguments in the literature that argue that current practice (votes at 18) is incompatible 
with our best theoretical understanding of what justifies inclusion in, or exclusion from the franchise. The 
extent to which these arguments make a positive case for an alternative age threshold varies, but they 
consistently settle on a point much lower than 16. For example, López-Guerra claims that “the best 
available evidence on moral and cognitive development suggests that at ten years of age normal children 
have the capacity to understand the idea of electing representatives and to adopt a position of their own, 
however rudimentary, on both the morality of the process and the alternatives at a given contest” (2012, 
30). This, on his account, suffices to warrant their inclusion. I shall not attempt to discuss all the arguments 
to this end, but focus on a small number of positions. 
Lau and I both argued in 2012 for a consistency based approach to the inclusion of children in our 
democratic practice. While she does not commit to a particular age at which she believes that 
enfranchisement is appropriate (860), her arguments can, and I believe should clearly be read as a defence 
of a voting age significantly lower than 16 (2012). I argued at that point for a lowering of the voting age 
to 14, coupled with an option for younger children to demonstrate capacity and thereby be granted early 
entry into the franchise (2012a, 2012b). Lau presents two arguments. In the first, the ‘symmetry 
argument’, she rejects the asymmetry between the young and the old in the granting of voting rights, 
which currently results in the elderly being allowed to vote whether or not they are capable, and children 
being denied the right to vote, whether or not they are capable. As she notes, “applied symmetrically, all 
conceptions of political capacity would lead to the disenfranchisement of the elderly if children are 
disenfranchised” (861). We are unwilling to disenfranchise the elderly, and so we ought to enfranchise 
children. Lau’s arguments rely heavily on a notion of capacity, and the claim that, whatever standard we 
decide to use, we ought to apply that standard equitably to all citizens, regardless of their age. 
Lau calls her second argument the ‘domains argument’ (2012, 865). This argument relies on the similarities 
in the requirements of capacity in various domains of activity, coupled with the unequal treatment of 
children in these domains. It is a position I have also examined in earlier work. For instance, I argued that 
the attribution of criminal capacity to a child who is not also attributed political capacity, is indefensible 
                                                          
1 If a state is unwilling to exclude adults on capability grounds, then even the capability grounds for excluding 
children becomes untenable. At that point, one might want to commit to a truly universal enfranchisement of 
citizens, from birth. While I think such a position is defensible, I will not address it here. 
 
 
because inconsistent – the considerations relevant to the attribution of capacity will be satisfied in both 
cases or neither. If we are willing to accept that a 15 year old (as in Australia), or a 10 year old (England), 
a 14 year old (Italy), or a 16 year old (Spain), are criminally responsible for their actions, we must, for the 
sake of consistency in the application of the notion of capacity, accept their political capacity to vote. In 
doing so, we accept a responsibility to satisfy their claims to voting. 
There are, of course, numerous objections to the equivalence being drawn here between criminal and 
political capacity. But in response, it is worth noting, first, that the legislative tools by which ages of 
criminal and voting are dictated often utilize the same language – appealing to understanding of the 
nature and significance of the action to be undertaken (Lau, 2012; Munn, 2012a, 2012b). If examine what 
it means, in each of these domains, to have an ‘understanding of the nature of the act’ or an 
‘understanding of the significance of the act’, the case for setting the age of voting higher than that of 
criminal responsibility becomes even more fraught. For when we examine the attribution of criminal 
responsibility, we see that there are clear thresholds for competence that must be met, even by adults, 
in order for them to be liable for criminal punishment, and the attribution of criminal responsibility to 
youth relies on these thresholds.  However, in the voting case, there are often no such thresholds, and 
where they exist, they are easier to satisfy than are criminal responsibility requirements (Munn, 2012b). 
Archard for instance describes the competence required of a voter as “a minimal rationality, an ability to 
distinguish between parties, candidates and policies in terms of interests, aims and goals which can be 
identified as worth promoting. In short, the ability is that of making a choice between alternatives on 
relevant grounds” (Archard, 101).  We can make a similar case for the attribution of medical capacity 
(Munn, 2012b), or for legal responsibilities in non-criminal settings. As Lau notes, “[w]hatever age a 
government considers appropriate for children to appreciate the seriousness of their legal matters would 
also be the same age at which children would be able to appreciate political matters” (867). 
Lachlan Umbers provides an argument from convergence. He claims that multiple theoretical approaches 
converge on a common conclusion; in this case, the conclusion that the conventional position, 
disenfranchising all those under 18, is untenable (2018, 1). Instead, the convergence approach suggests 
that “children from around the age of 12 be enfranchised” (2018, 2). He argues that whether you prefer 
instrumental or non-instrumental approaches to the justification of democracy, the goods you are likely 
to appeal to will “likely be better promoted by the enfranchisement of minors than by their continued 
exclusion” (2018, 2). Within the category of Instrumental approaches, Umbers considers epistemic 
justifications of Democracy, such as those offered by Estlund (2008) and Landemore (2012) and 
participatory approaches such as those of Mill (1861) and Pateman (1970). Non-instrumentally, he 
considers Liberty (Pettit, 2012) and Equality based approaches. Within equality based approaches, he 
discusses expressive (Beitz 1989; Griffin, 2003; Waldron, 1999), distributive (Brighouse, 1996; Christiano, 
2008), and relational (Anderson, 1999; Scheffler, 2003, Kolodny, 2014) accounts. Again, he claims that 
 
 
defenders of each of these styles of approach have reason to endorse the enfranchisement of children. 
He notes that the “convergence, in itself, constitutes substantial evidence that the exclusion of children 
is unjust” (2018, 18). In his defence of this wide-ranging set of claims, capacity for political participation 
features heavily. He claims that children as young as 12 have the capacity to make positive epistemic 
contributions to democratic outcomes (2018, 7), and that “[t]here is every reason to think that sufficiently 
mature minors will generally have sufficient capacities in the political domain” (2018, 9). 
There are many more examples of such arguments, but the above discussion already illustrates how much 
further they go than any active campaign for changes to state practice. It is worth noting however, a logical 
extension of the focus on capacity, which is that we may not be justified in having a minimum voting age 
at all. If we accept that any voting age runs two risks, firstly, of falsely including the in fact incapable, and 
secondly of excluding the in fact capable, then our task becomes one of finding the optimal balance 
between these risks. Yet, the risk profile of these is unequal. We might, following Goodin & Lau’s 
expansion of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, argue that the inclusion of the incapable doesn’t in practice 
undermine the quality of democratic decision-making (2011). As such, no significant risk is generated by 
over-inclusion in the franchise, whereas, by contrast, there is at least significant harm caused by under-
inclusion, namely in the breach of the civil or political rights of those so excluded. This point was also made 
by López-Guerra, who claimed that justice in political inclusion is served by the granting of equal voting 
rights to all those capable of political participation, and “since age and mental condition are imperfect 
indicators of this capacity, justice would be best served by abolishing all requirements for voting based on 
age” (López-Guerra, 2012, 26). This position, obviously, goes even further. 
Finally, I should note that there is sometimes overlap between the practical arguments (for votes at 16) 
and the theoretical, particularly related to the Austrian experience post-2007. While there is no empirical 
evidence on the effects (whether beneficial or not) of expanding the franchise to those below the age of 
16, there is, increasingly, some evidence of the beneficial effects of expanding the franchise from 18 to 
16. Tommy Peto (2018) utilized this evidence in arguing for the reduction of the voting age to 16 on 
practical grounds. He claims that we can now demonstrate that 16 & 17 year olds are not only as politically 
interested as other voters, but also as knowledgeable and that they vote just as competently (Wagner et 
al., 2012: 373–376; Zeglovits, 2013, 251; Zeglovits and Zandonella, 2013: 1089). Further, he notes, they 
have higher turnout rates than other (older) first time voters do (Bergh, 2013: 92; Zeglovits, 2013: 252; 
Zeglovits and Aichholzer, 2014: 351–361). This evidence helps rebut the claim that 16 year olds are not 
competent to vote, but it does not give us any reason to believe that we have, at 16, found the right place 





4. What benefits could arise from abandoning incrementalism? 
There is much to be said for incrementalism in general. Where we have a greater goal in mind, such as a 
significant reduction in global carbon emissions, we might well want to progressively implement 
restrictions on emissions, and evaluate the consequences of each restriction before proceeding to the 
next. However, if the increments are poorly calibrated, they can fail in multiple ways. The initial target 
may fail to achieve buy-in or compliance (as has arguably happened with the attempt to reduce the voting 
age over the past 30 years), or they may not suffice to produce any tangible benefits (as appears to be the 
case with the Paris Climate agreement, see Allen, 2019). So it is important to be willing to abandon an 
incremental approach, if it is failing to achieve our desired ends. Sometimes, as Levmore puts it, we should 
favour a leap over baby steps (2010, 816). In the case of voting rights, arguing for a leap may produce the 
small steps in the right direction, which we have not yet made. 
Chan & Clayton’s 2006 argument against lowering the voting age to 16 appealed to a range of 
considerations. Amongst these was that of public opinion, that the public (in particular, for these purposes, 
the voting public, which excludes those under 18) does not support lowering the voting age. One potential 
benefit of abandoning incrementalism is that a public commitment to more extreme positions on 
enfranchisement could help to normalize the position of lowering the voting age to 16. This would arise 
by positioning voting at 16 as a plausible compromise between the drastic shift argued for by philosophers, 
and the status quo. Shifting the Overton window to situate voting at 16 firmly within the center of 
acceptable positions on the age of enfranchisement, would increase the plausibility of enacting 
meaningful political change on the issue. As Joseph Lehman notes, successful politicians are not those 
who shift the Overton window, but those who recognize when it shifts, and adapt their policies and 
positions to continue to represent the views of a substantial number of their constituents.2 Politicians, he 
claims, “typically don't determine what is politically acceptable; more often they react to it and validate 
it. Generally speaking, policy change follows political change, which itself follows social change” (Lehman, 
2010). I am suggesting that we may have more success in popularizing votes at 16, if it looks like a 
conservative position on enfranchisement rather than the extremely liberal position it is currently seen 
as. The key, of course, is to change the public opinion. We have evidence, over the course of three decades 
                                                          
2 Regarding the Overton window, it should be noted that this concept, while initially developed by a right-
leaning think tank in the US, and while it has been used as a partial explanation of Trumpism, and 
enthusiastically embraced by the alt-right (again, in the US) in an attempt to push their agenda, is not in 
itself problematic. What is potentially worrying is the failure, broadly speaking, of liberals to recognize 
and respond to the systematic use of it by the right, in an attempt to shift the boundaries of acceptable 
discourse. Whether you are liberal about some particular issue, or about many or all issues, it is a useful 
tool for engaging the public. 
 
 
of argument, that the opinion of the voting population hasn’t changed significantly on this issue. Those in 
favour remain in the minority. One explanatory factor might be that the evidence does not support the 
move from 18 to 16. It supports a more drastic change, such as from 18 to 12, as Umbers (2018) suggested. 
We might also be concerned about treating 16 as the endpoint, rather than simply the first of a series of 
incremental changes along a path towards complete enfranchisement of the young. Isolating 16 as the 
goal makes it vulnerable to criticism via either slippery slope arguments or attempts at a reductio. One 
can imagine an opponent of votes at 16 arguing that the very reasoning the ‘Votes at 16’ campaign uses 
to defend the competence of 16 year olds, could be used to defend the competence of 6 year olds. In fact, 
Chan and Clayton make almost this claim, calling it the ‘appeal to insignificant differences’ in the 
competence of 16 year olds as compared to 18 year olds. They say that “for all we know, we could use the 
same argument repeatedly until we have enfranchised six-year-olds, which would be absurd” (2006, 540). 
While I deny the claimed absurdity, I am not committed to an incrementalist approach, so such a denial 
is easy for me. Similarly, López-Guerra analyses the literature on moral development and concludes that 
it suggests the age limit should be lower than ten (2012, 137), which suggests that he too denies the 
absurdity of granting such rights to six year olds. 
We have spent the past thirty years arguing, mostly unsuccessfully, for the first move in the incremental 
chain that would lead to a just system of enfranchisement, and even in those states where the first move 
has been successful, the political will to attempt further improvements is not present. I suggest that an 
alternative which is at least worth trying, is to normalize the concept of voting at 16, by arguing at the 
public rather than the academic level for the much more expansive conceptions of enfranchisement which 
many academics think are defensible. Doing so may work to the advantage of children, by making moves 
such as the lowering of the voting age into the reasonable compromise position, rather than an extreme 
to be opposed. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have, previously, argued for a combination approach, of first lowering the voting age (to 14, in 2012a), 
and secondly, instituting a particular kind of capacity test for those under whatever our lowered voting 
age turns out to be (2012b). Whatever age we pick as the cutoff, there will be people, and usually many 
people, who have a good claim to being as capable, and as such, as deserving of inclusion, as those above 
the line. The question was of how to leave open the potential for their inclusion, while putting forward a 
politically viable proposal for expanding the franchise. These days, I incline towards a more fully inclusive 
enfranchisement. Allow, but do not compel, all citizens to vote, from whenever they desire to. If they 
prove in practice incapable of successfully filling out a ballot, their votes will be caught and discarded in 
 
 
the processes that already exist for this exact purpose. This approach has the virtue of being supported 
by the evidence we have of the political capacity of children. That is, many of them are capable, and are 
currently wrongly excluded, including many who are much younger than 16. It generates some risk via the 
inclusion of incapable voters into the system, but we already accept that risk in the inclusion of 
incompetent adults, and the actual levels of risk involved are trivial. Advocating for this expansive 
conception of enfranchisement also offers a potential benefit, as discussed in this article, of making extant 
political campaigns to lower the voting age to 16 look more appealing to the general public, by comparison. 
That is, public defense of this extreme position on enfranchisement, shifts the domain of acceptable public 
argument towards inclusion. In doing so, it provides an important counterweight to certain trendy 
epistocratic arguments for curtailing the franchise (Brennan, 2011, 2016, 2018).  
I hope that events will overtake my skepticism here, and that we will shortly be deluged with states 
following the lead of Brazil, Austria, and Malta in lowering the voting age to 16. Australia might be next, 
with a bill under consideration at the moment. Or, if some party other than the Conservatives win power 
in the 2019 British election, the UK too could make this change. However, as I have argued above, even if 
we suddenly reach a tipping point regarding the enfranchisement of 16 & 17 year olds, and a voting age 
of 16 becomes the new norm, this doesn’t eliminate the injustice being done to children through political 
exclusion. It reduces it, by enfranchising some of those who have good claims to inclusion, but it leaves 
us with a further battle to fight, namely, the inclusion of those under 16 who have good claims to political 
inclusion via enfranchisement. So, even in this best case scenario, a move away from incrementalist 
arguments will make the next step easier to complete. Lowering the voting age to 14 (or 12, or…) is easier 
to defend, when it is a compromise position between the status quo, and some other extreme, such as 
enfranchisement from birth. 
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